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Introduction
In this chapter we provide (1) an argument for why ethics should be 
naturalized, (2) an analysis of why it is not yet naturalized, (3) a defense 
of ethical naturalism against two fallacies—Hume and Moore’s—that 
ethical naturalism allegedly commits, and (4) a proposal that normative 
ethics is best conceived as part of human ecology committed to pluralistic 
relativism (Flanagan, 1995, 2002; Wong, 1984, 1996, 2006b). The latter 
substantive view, supported by a neocompatibilist view of human agency, 
constitutes the essence of Duke naturalism. It provides a credible substan-
tive alternative to bald or eliminativist Australian ethical naturalism, espe-
cially one that supports moral skepticism (Mackie), and to the more reticent 
Pittsburgh naturalism.1
Naturalism in the Broad Sense
Ethical naturalism is a variety of a broader philosophical naturalism, 
so it will be good to say what naturalism in the broad sense is. According 
to the OED the original philosophical meaning of the term “naturalism” 
dates back to the seventeenth century and meant “a view of the world, 
and of man’s relation to it, in which only the operation of natural (as 
opposed to supernatural or spiritual) laws and forces is admitted or 
assumed.”
In a recent presidential address to the American Philosophical Association, 
Barry Stroud writes:
Naturalism on any reading is opposed to supernaturalism.  .  .  .  By “supernaturalism” 
I mean the invocation of an agent or force which somehow stands outside the 
familiar natural world and so whose doings cannot be understood as part of it. Most 
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metaphysical systems of the past included some such agent. A naturalist conception 
of the world would be opposed to all of them. (Stroud, 1996)2
Stroud’s comment can either be about ontology (i.e., that naturalists reject 
agents or forces that stand outside the natural world) or about methodol-
ogy (i.e., that naturalists reject the invocation of such agents or forces in 
their philosophical projects). These issues will be ﬂ eshed out below. For 
now, we can note that ethical naturalism holds a number of thin onto-
logical commitments, and some more substantial methodological ones.
Why Ethics Isn’t Naturalized
Ethical naturalism has a fair number of philosophical advocates, but most 
people reject it—including many in the academy. The reason has to do 
with the close connection in American culture (and throughout much of 
the rest of the world) between ethics and religion, and thus with the super-
natural. Over 90% of Americans believe in a personal God who answers 
their prayers. Similar numbers believe in heaven (slightly fewer believe in 
hell). They believe that God, Yahweh, Allah is the source of moral law and 
he rewards (or punishes) “souls” based on how well they conform to the 
moral law. Most people believe in God and think that moral knowledge 
is knowledge of what God creates or endorses as “good,” “bad,” “right,” 
and “wrong.” Religious reasons are offered and accepted in America, 
and most of the rest of the world, as legitimate moral grounding reasons. 
Ethical naturalism, as a species of naturalism, rejects religious grounding 
reasons.
Let us call an individual a scientiﬁ c naturalist if she does not permit 
the invocation of supernatural forces in understanding, explaining, and 
accounting for what happens in this world. An ethical naturalist (assuming 
this person already accepts scientiﬁ c naturalism) applies the same princi-
pled restriction to describing, explaining, recommending, endorsing, pro-
hibiting, and justifying values, norms, actions, principles, and so on.3 In 
other words, the complete warrant for any norm or value must be cashed 
out without invoking the views or commands of a divinity.
It is an interesting and important question whether one could be a 
naturalist, either scientiﬁ c and/or ethical, and still believe in supernatural 
entities or forces. A full 40% of the scientists listed in American Men and 
Women in Science not only believe in a personal God but also believe he 
listens to their prayers (Larson & Witham, 1997). Since (almost) all scien-
tists are scientiﬁ c naturalists at least when it comes to the domain they 
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study in this world, the charitable interpretation is that these scientists 
believe that God exists in God’s world, not in this one. If he “listens” to 
prayers and, especially, if he responds to them, he better utilize the laws 
of nature without any perceivable interference with their normal opera-
tion. So God can’t (or at least doesn’t) mess with f = ma, the speed of light, 
the nature of water, neurochemistry, economics, and so on.4
Call the folk view that there is a creator God (possibly one to whose 
bosom “we” go after we leave this world), but to whose thoughts we have 
no access, and who does no work in this world, has no effects on how this 
world operates, “folk naturalism.” This view is relatively common. Indeed, 
it must be if we are to make sense charitably of the behavior of scientists 
who restrict themselves to physical explanation of physical phenomena 
but believe nonetheless in God.
Most people accept that science can legitimately take the folk naturalis-
tic stance. Seamstresses, carpenters, plumbers, auto mechanics, and scien-
tists all practice as if they are committed to folk naturalism. Scientists take 
ofﬁ cial vows, as it were, when they declare themselves to be scientists in 
some domain of inquiry. There is no glaring inconsistency in thinking that 
God set up the world in such a way that scientists or auto mechanics can 
describe, explain, predict, and manipulate what happens in that world. 
The fact that there is no inconsistency does not mean it makes epistemic 
sense—that there are any good reasons—to believe in God.
When it comes to ethics, though, most people will balk at restricting 
themselves to folk naturalism. For complex reasons (though having to do 
in some large measure with the importance of morality), most people 
would like to see moral value justiﬁ ed in a very strong way. It would be 
good if moral values, beliefs, norms, and the like had something like the 
necessity that mathematical theorems have. One way this could work is if 
an omniscient and all-loving being makes the rules and then provides us 
with epistemic access to them. There are various familiar stories of how 
this works. Human souls exist prior to bodily implantation in the company 
of “The Good” and, once embodied, have the ability to remember, recol-
lect, or intuit what is good, bad, right, and wrong (Plato; and with certain 
modiﬁ cations G. E. Moore). God directly illuminates faithful human hearts 
and minds through grace (Augustine). God produces a world and mind 
such that his perfect nature can be deductively established, and with some 
additional difﬁ culty, his will can be known (Anselm, Descartes, Alvin 
Plantinga).5 God speaks to certain sages who write down his moral rules 
in sacred texts (the Torah, the Old and New Testament, the Q’ran), and 
so on. The last view—that we have epistemic access to God’s will and 
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commands through sacred texts—is the dominant view: moral values, 
norms, and principles have their ultimate ground or warrant in divine 
revelation. There are many good values expressed in these sacred texts—the 
Golden Rule, for example. Most naturalists will endorse the Golden Rule, 
but all will reject that its warrant relies on any supernatural source.
Of course, nontheistic conceptions of ethics have been nearly as preva-
lent in the course of human history. Confucianism, for example, does not 
refer to any theistic beliefs in order to justify its conception of a virtuous 
life. Instead, classical Confucianism appealed to notions of social harmony 
and emphasized the importance of a virtuous life grounded in practices of 
ritual propriety—that is, the importance of showing others respect by using 
society’s ritualized forms for doing so (e.g., norms of propriety and social 
etiquette). Buddhism, too, does not ground its beliefs on the command of 
a deity or the sanctity of sacred texts but rather on the cessation of human 
suffering, which it believes is caused by insatiable desires based upon faulty 
conceptions of reality and subjectivity.
Both folk naturalism and scientiﬁ c naturalism are methodological and 
domain restricted. Neither view warrants belief in any supernatural forces 
or entities outside this world, but both allow it. Naturalism in the broad 
sense does not prohibit there being supernatural forces or beings; it is just 
that such forces or beings do not—at least since she’s been up and 
running—have causal (or any other sort of) intercourse with Mother 
Nature. A stronger form of naturalism says that what there is, and all there 
is, in this and any actual world is natural. Stronger still would be the claim 
that what there is, and all there is, in any possible world is natural—that 
it is impossible for there to be any world that contains supernatural beings, 
entities, and the like. (This view has its attractions because it has rhetorical 
force in telling everyday supernaturalists that one is just not going to yield 
them any ground. However, it epistemically overreaches.)6
At any rate, what seems warranted is this: there are no good epistemic 
reasons to believe that there are any of the entities, processes, and forces 
of the sort posited by any supernaturalist ontology. Call this quietistic 
ontological naturalism. The view is bold but quietistic at the same time—
thus its name. The Buddha at his inaugural address claimed that no human, 
himself included—as enlightened as he was—was in any position to give 
epistemically respectable answers (possibly to even formulate epistemically 
respectable questions) on matters such as those that both ordinary 
religious folk and wooly metaphysicians are inclined to speak. The Buddha 
was a Wittgensteinian as far as epistemology goes: “Whereof one 
cannot speak, one ought to be silent.” For present purposes, consider us 
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committed to this form of naturalism. What is warranted, all things con-
sidered, is a form of ontological naturalism about this world, which is the 
only world we have reason to believe exists. Thus, for all we know, what 
there is—and all there is—is the natural world. Because the conception of 
what is “natural” is not ﬁ xed, the central concept in the motto lacks a clear 
and determinate meaning. Still, vague as it is, the view is not friendly to 
theism.7
Why Naturalize?
The ontological naturalism advanced in this paper opposes belief in super-
natural forces. It also rejects various forms of ontological dualism, such as 
a sharp bifurcation of humans and the rest of the natural world, as well as 
mind-body dualism.
Ethical naturalism is not chieﬂ y concerned with ontology but with the 
proper way of approaching moral inquiry. Ethical naturalism thus has a 
number of methodological commitments, only part of which consists in 
a rejection of supernatural forces when explaining or justifying values and 
principles.8 If naturalism were only opposed to supernaturalism, then the 
category of ethical naturalists would be overly inclusive, and if it were only 
committed to being receptive to ﬁ ndings from the natural sciences, if 
its most plausible core doctrine was a kind of open-mindedness, as Barry 
Stroud (1996) has suggested, then it would be difﬁ cult to see how it could 
represent a distinctive view.
However, naturalistic ethics does have a number of substantive method-
ological commitments. Chief among these is the belief that moral phi-
losophy should not employ a distinctive a priori method of yielding 
substantive, self-evident and foundational truths from pure conceptual 
analysis. The claims of ethical naturalism cannot be shielded from empir-
ical testing. Indeed, the naturalist is committed to there being no sharp 
distinction between her investigation and those of relevant other dis-
ciplines (particularly between epistemology and psychology). In other 
words, ethical science must be continuous with other sciences.
In order to better understand what naturalistic ethics entails, it might 
be helpful to consider varieties of moral theory that are not supernatural 
yet not natural either. Some such theories are semantic and maintain that 
moral terms (or predicates) cannot be cashed out using non-normative 
terms (or predicates). More frequently, such theories afﬁ rm a metaphysical 
thesis which naturalists deny—namely, the existence of irreducible and 
non-natural moral facts or properties.9 Other non-naturalists maintain the 
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autonomy of the moral, that morality is essentially autonomous from 
other forms of inquiry—namely, from the natural sciences.
Consider, for example, morality as conceived by Immanuel Kant. In the 
Groundwork, Kant writes that a “worse service cannot be rendered morality 
than that an attempt be made to derive it from examples.” Trying to derive 
ethical principles “from the disgusting mishmash” of psychological, socio-
logical, or anthropological observation, from the insights about human 
nature that abound “in the chit-chat of daily life” and that delight “the 
multitude” and upon which “the empty headed regale themselves” is not 
the right way to do moral philosophy.10
What is the right way to do moral philosophy? According to Kant, we 
need “a completely isolated metaphysics of morals,” a pure ethics unmixed 
with the empirical study of human nature. Once moral philosophy has 
derived the principles that ought to govern the wills of all rational beings, 
then and only then should we seek “the extremely rare merit of a truly 
philosophical popularity.”11
Kantian ethics, qua philosophical theory, might not seem to be openly 
supernaturalistic. However, it is not naturalistic either. Kant maintains, for 
example, that postulating the existence of God is essential to ethics.12 
What’s more, he claims that the self, the will, and the laws of freedom 
reside in the realm of the noumena—which is disconnected from all 
phenomena that could be studied by science. Kant’s ethics cannot be 
naturalistic because we cannot give a naturalistic account of these things. 
For example, we cannot account for a faculty of pure practical reason 
that possesses moral principles not gleaned from observation and assess-
ment of human practices that work differentially well to meet our aims, 
and which, in addition, ﬁ ts with the ﬁ ndings of the mental sciences. 
There is no such faculty that meets these criteria, and thus no faculty to 
account for.
Kant’s rationale is transcendental. Ethical naturalism is nontranscenden-
tal since it rejects divine command or, in this case, since it will not locate 
the rationale for moral claims in the a priori dictates of a faculty of pure 
practical reason. Thus, ethical naturalists will need to explain the appeal 
of transcendental rationales and explain why they are less credible than 
pragmatic rationales (possibly because they are disguised forms of 
pragmatic rationales). Suppose, as seems plausible, that Kant intended his 
grounding of the categorical imperative in pure practical reason to both 
rationalize the categorical imperative and motivate us to abide by it. If one 
denies (as we do) that there is such a thing as pure practical reason, and 
if one also thinks that the categorical imperative expresses deep moral 
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insight, then one needs to give an alternative account of how Kant came 
(or could have come) to express the deep insights he expressed. Likely 
sources include his own pietistic Lutheranism, his wise observations that 
many thoughtful people see a distinction between happiness and good-
ness, as well as emerging enlightenment ideals about human equality and 
respect for persons.13
Unless one is an eliminativist or a physicalist in the reductive sense—that 
is, a bald naturalist—then reasons exist, as do norms and ideals. Reasons 
furthermore can be causes. However, being a reason that causes is not the 
same as being a reasonable cause; a motivating reason is not, in virtue of 
being motivating, something that is reasonable to believe or invoke in 
justiﬁ cation of one’s (other) thoughts or actions. The belief that “Santa 
Claus will deliver coal to me unless I behave myself” will motivate, but it 
is not the sort of thing we think a sensible adult should believe in, let alone 
be motivated by.
However, since beliefs that have contents that don’t refer are no problem 
for the naturalist, the causal power and efﬁ cacy of beliefs about things that 
don’t exist is not something that worries the naturalist either. It is largely 
a matter of psychological, sociological, and anthropological inquiry why 
different sorts of things are motivating reasons, that is, why certain reasons 
and not others motivate at different times and places. The role for the 
normative naturalist is to recommend ways of ﬁ nding good reasons for 
belief and action and to indicate why it makes sense to be motivated by 
such reasons.14
Just as a naturalist cannot accept the postulate of a faculty of pure prac-
tical reason, she also cannot accept the notion (found in Kant) that humans 
have metaphysical freedom of the will. Descartes famously articulated the 
idea this way: “But the will is so free in its nature, that it can never be 
constrained.  .  .  .  And the whole action of the soul consists in this, that 
solely because it desires something, it causes a little gland to which it is 
closely united to move in a way requisite to produce the effect which 
relates to this desire.” The twentieth-century philosopher Roderick 
Chisholm (1966) puts the point about free agency, what he calls “agent 
causation,” this way: “[I]f we are responsible  .  .  .  then we have a prerogative 
which some would attribute only to God: each of us when we act, is a 
prime mover unmoved. In doing what we do, we cause certain things to 
happen, and nothing—or no one—causes us to cause those events to 
happen.”15 Descartes’s and Chisholm’s views are openly non-naturalistic. 
This sort of free will violates the basic laws of science, so the naturalist 
must offer a different analysis.
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The most plausible view is “neocompatibilism” (Flanagan, 2002). 
Compatibilism is the view that free will is compatible with determinism. 
A neocompatibilist rejects the dialectic that frames the problem as one 
between free will and determinism because our best physics now says that 
there are both ontologically deterministic and indeterministic causal pro-
cesses, so determinism is not the issue. Causation is. And no matter how 
one views things, causation is ubiquitous. So far, it does not look as if 
indeterministic processes at the quantum level “percolate up” to macro-
levels. However, in principle, they might. If they do, some macroprocesses 
might not be deterministic. But it is a nonstarter to think this will help 
secure a place for “metaphysical freedom of the will” or “agent causation.” 
Consider the hypothesis that there are in fact quantum-gravitational effects 
or processes in the microtubules of certain neuronal segments. Such 
random swerves do nothing to secure anything like agent causation, which 
involves an agent doing something as a prime mover himself unmoved.
On the other side of the dichotomy sits the concept of “free will.” 
Descartes, in the quotation above, quantiﬁ es over will (or a faculty of will). 
Naturalists from Hume on have tried to tame the concept of free will. The 
picture that Hume and other compatibilists paint is a fairly good ﬁ t with 
our best contemporary science. However, to really make the compatibilist 
position work, one will need to read Hume et al. as resisting the posit of 
a distinctive faculty of will—that is, as rejecting the faculty psychology 
within which free will, reason, imagination, and their suite historically are 
situated.
What is “new”—and thus what warrants the name “neocompatibil-
ist”—is the outright denial of any faculty that ﬁ ts the description of free 
will. Why? Because the concept utterly fails to locate anything signiﬁ cant 
that we mean to be talking about. There is no such thing as “will” and 
thus no such thing as a “free will.” (Here is one of the rare places 
where the eliminativist move is totally warranted.) There is no faculty of 
will in the human mind/brain. Talk of dedicated faculties can be useful 
when speaking of sensory and perceptual systems, but no respectable cog-
nitive neuroscientist thinks there are distinctive faculties of will, reason, 
imagination, and the like.16 If there is no such faculty as will, then there 
is no way for it to be—large, small, heavy, light, free, or unfree. As Dewey 
says, “what men and women have fought and died for in the name of 
freedom is multiple and various. But it has never been metaphysical 
freedom of the will.” This was true when Dewey said it in 1922, and it is 
true 83 years later. So change the subject; there is no such thing as free 
will.17
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Nevertheless, persons make choices. Typically, they do so with live 
options before them. If new reasons present themselves, they can change 
course.18 If not, they do what they choose or intend. There is a phenom-
enology to these activities and processes; persons experience themselves 
choosing, intending, and willing. Ethics sees persons as choosing and thus 
works the quarry looking for veins of voluntary action that involves rea-
soning, deliberation, and choice. Moral practices of shaping character, of 
assigning praise and blame, work over the topography of voluntary, invol-
untary, and nonvoluntary actions, and various admixtures of these. 
Aristotle and Confucius saw how this worked with zero help from the 
ﬁ ction of “will”—“free” or otherwise.
Understanding Morality
The genealogy of morals asks how moral sensibilities, moral values, 
moral norms, and so on, originate and how they develop. There is 
some consensus among naturalistically oriented philosophers that some 
combination of cultural anthropology, the psychology of learning, and 
evolutionary biology will play key roles in providing a genealogy of 
morals. Dewey is helpful: “For practical purposes morals means customs, 
folkways, established collective habits. This is a commonplace of the 
anthropologist, though the moral theorist generally suffers from an illu-
sion that his own place and day is, or ought to be, an exception” (Dewey, 
1922, p. 55).
In the following passage from The Descent of Man, Darwin suggests the 
general form that an adequate genealogy of morals might take:
In order that primeval men, or the ape-like progenitors of man, should become 
social  .  .  .  they must have acquired the same instinctive feelings.  .  .  .  They would 
have felt uneasy when separated from their comrades, for whom they would have 
felt some degree of love, they would have warned each other of danger, and have 
given mutual aid in attack or defence. All this implies some degree of sympathy, 
ﬁ delity, and courage.  .  .  .  [T]o the instinct of sympathy  .  .  .  it is primarily due that 
we habitually bestow both praise and blame on others, whilst we love the former 
and dread the latter when applied to ourselves; and this instinct no doubt was 
originally acquired, like all the other social instincts, through natural selection.  .  .  .
  [W]ith increased experience and reason, man perceives the more remote conse-
quences of his actions, and the self-regarding virtues, such as temperance, chastity, 
&c., which during earlier times are  .  .  .  utterly disregarded come to be highly esteemed 
or even held sacred.  .  .  .  Ultimately our moral sense or conscience becomes a highly 
complex sentiment—originating in the social instincts, largely guided by the 
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approbation of our fellow-men, ruled by reason, self-interest, and in later times by 
deep religious feelings, and conﬁ rmed by instruction and habit. (Darwin, 1871/
2004)19
Of course the genealogical story—both ontogenic and phylogenic—is even 
more complex than Darwin sketches. Morality evolved and developed in 
order to coordinate and harmonize the interests (both self- and other-
regarding) of humans living in mutually dependent communities. Such 
communities would need to regulate conﬂ icts of interest, divisions of labor, 
and hierarchy arrangements, and systems of moral norms would help make 
such cooperative projects beneﬁ cial. On the self-regarding side, morality 
evolved to shape character and specify worthwhile lives and ideals of 
behavior to which to strive. To understand the full story, we will need what 
we only have pieces of—namely, insights from evolutionary biology, animal 
ethology, developmental psychology, learning theory, psychiatry, cogni-
tive neuroscience, and cultural anthropology. All these disciplines and 
research programs are essential to (and thus have a say in) the genealogy.
Normative ethics, on the other hand, is concerned with articulating and 
defending which virtues, values, norms, and principles will reliably guide 
favorable character development, intra- and interpersonal well-being, 
social coordination, and harmony. Normative ethics involves saying and 
justifying what is right, wrong, good, or bad. Murder and rape are wrong, 
honesty is the best policy, and so on. Ethical naturalists evaluate their 
subject matter using standards that are derived from certain human needs, 
desires, and purposes. Some of these might be thought of as ﬁ xed by our 
natures as social animals; humans need peace, security, friendship, and so 
on. The speciﬁ c form of these needs, the ways they are best met, will have 
a culturally variable component. Some aims or needs are quite culturally 
speciﬁ c and defensible. The aim(s) of morality are thus included as part of 
what humans need and desire.
Naturalistic Epistemology and the Problem of Normativity
In “Epistemology Naturalized,” Quine (1969) suggested that epistemology 
be assimilated to psychology. Many have read Quine’s arguments for 
naturalization as arguments against a normative role for epistemology. 
Hilary Putnam writes: “The elimination of the normative is attempted 
mental suicide.  .  .  .  Those who raise the slogan ‘epistemology natural-
ized’  .  .  .  generally disparage the traditional enterprises of epistemology” 
(Putnam, 1993, p. 229). And Jaegwon Kim writes: “If justiﬁ cation drops 
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out of epistemology, knowledge itself drops out of epistemology. For our 
concept of knowledge is inseparably tied to that of justiﬁ cation  .  .  .  itself a 
normative notion” (Kim, 1993, pp. 224–225).20
The alleged problem with epistemology naturalized is this: psychology 
is not in general concerned with norms of rational belief, but with the 
description and explanation of mental performance and mentally medi-
ated performance and capacities. However, the best way to think of epis-
temology naturalized is not one in which epistemology is a “chapter of 
psychology” where psychology is understood merely descriptively, but 
rather to think of naturalized epistemology as having two components: a 
descriptive-genealogical component and a normative component. Furthermore, 
not even the descriptive-genealogical component will consist of purely 
psychological generalizations, for much of the information about actual 
epistemic practices will come from biology, cognitive neuroscience, 
sociology, anthropology, and history—from the human sciences broadly 
construed. More obviously, normative epistemology will not be part of 
psychology, for it involves the gathering together of norms of inference, 
belief, and knowing that lead to success in ordinary reasoning and in 
science. And the evolved canons of inductive and deductive logic, statis-
tics, and probability theory most certainly do not describe actual human 
reasoning practices. These canons (take, e.g., principles governing repre-
sentative sampling and warnings about afﬁ rming the consequent) come 
from abstracting successful epistemic practices from unsuccessful ones. 
The database is, as it were, provided by observation of humanity, but the 
human sciences do not (at least as standardly practiced) involve extraction 
of the norms. Thus, epistemology naturalized is not epistemology psy-
chologized simpliciter.21 However, since successful practice—both mental 
and physical—is the standard by which norms are sorted and raised or 
lowered in epistemic status, pragmatism reigns.22
The natural objection here is that all the epistemological work has been 
done in identifying the cognitive aims, and that the relevance of empirical 
work is just in identifying what accomplishes those aims. The two projects 
seem distinct, with neither one affecting the other. How is this “psycholo-
gizing” epistemology to any extent whatsoever? However, as we noted 
earlier, a naturalistic approach works back and forth between the norma-
tive and the descriptive. Our aims are various and capable of speciﬁ cation 
on many levels. Given naturalism’s methodology, we can modify our cog-
nitive aims—at least on the more speciﬁ c levels—with knowledge of how 
our minds work.23
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Naturalistic Ethics and the Problem of Normativity
The same worries that Putnam and Kim express over Quine’s conception of 
naturalizing epistemology recapitulate Kant’s worries over Hume’s approach 
to naturalizing ethics. John McDowell’s criticism of “bald naturalism” in 
favor of “second nature naturalism” is arguably a way of stating the same 
concern: namely, that at least some kinds of naturalism are not equipped 
to explain ethical normativity.24 In any case, moral psychology, sociology, 
and anthropology (what Kant called the “empirical side of morals”) might 
tell us what individuals or groups think ought to be done, what they believe 
is right or wrong, what they deem a good person, and so on. However, all 
the human scientiﬁ c facts taken together, including that they are widely 
and strongly believed, could never justify any of these views.
But we should conceive naturalistic ethics in pretty much the same way 
we conceive naturalized epistemology. Naturalistic ethics will contain a 
descriptive-genealogical component that will specify certain basic capacities 
and propensities of Homo sapiens, for example, sympathy, empathy, egoism, 
and so on, relevant to moral life. It will explain how people come to feel, 
think, and act about moral matters in the way(s) they do. It will explain 
how and in what ways moral learning, engagement, and response involve 
the emotions (and which emotions). It will explain what moral disagree-
ment consists in and why it occurs, and it will explain why people some-
times resolve disagreement by recourse to agreements to tolerate each 
other without, however, approving of each other’s beliefs, actions, prac-
tices, and institutions. It will tell us what people are doing (or trying to 
do) when they make normative judgments. And ﬁ nally, or as a conse-
quence of all this, it will try to explain what goes on when people try to 
educate the young, improve the moral climate, propose moral theories, 
and so on.
Defenders of naturalistic ethics are continually asked to explain how a 
better picture of moral psychology can contribute to our understanding of 
ethical theory in general and normative ethics in particular. Moral psychol-
ogy, cognitive science, cultural anthropology, and the other mental and 
social sciences can tell us perhaps how people in fact think and behave. 
Ethical theories tell us what the aims of ethics are, where to look to ground 
morality, and so on, while normative ethics tells us how we ought to feel, 
think, and act. It is hard to see, the objectors claim, how such factual or 
descriptive knowledge can contribute to the projects of helping us to 
understand the aims of ethics, where the sources of moral motivation lie, 
and how we ought to live.
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First, it should be pointed out that every great moral philosopher has put 
forward certain descriptive-genealogical claims, certain theories of philo-
sophical psychology which postulate basic human dispositions that help 
or hinder morality (e.g., reason, emotion) and the sources of moral motiva-
tion. This is a ubiquitous feature of the moral tradition; everyone thinks 
that philosophical psychology (including, e.g., philosophical anthropol-
ogy) has implications for ethics. And although most of these claims suffer 
from sampling problems and were proposed in a time when the human 
sciences did not exist to test them, they are almost all testable—indeed 
some have been tested (Flanagan, 1991). For example, here are four claims 
familiar from the history of ethics which ﬁ t the bill of testable hypotheses 
relevant to normative ethics: (1) He who knows the good does it, (2) if you 
(really) have one virtue, you have the rest, (3) morality breaks down in 
a roughly linear fashion with breakdowns in the strength and visibility 
of social constraints, and (4) in a situation of profuse abundance innate 
sympathy and benevolence will “receive tenfold increase” and the 
“cautious, jealous virtue of justice would never once have been dreamed 
of” (Hume 1751/1975, pp. 183–184). Presumably, how the descriptive-
genealogical claims fare matters to the normative theories and would have 
mattered to their proponents.25
If this much is right, the question arises as to why the contemporary 
movement to naturalize ethics raises so many hackles. It is true that philo-
sophical psychology—the sort that can be done from an armchair and which 
is an assemblage of virtually every possible view of mind—is now giving 
way to scientiﬁ c psychology, which may eliminate some of the classical views 
of mind on empirical grounds. If this happens, then our ethical theories 
will be framed by better background theories about our natures. What 
could be wrong with this?
Hume’s Objection
The standard view, again, is that nothing normative follows from any set 
of descriptive-genealogical generalizations. David Hume is supposed to be 
the father of this line of objection. Yet Hume (along with Aristotle) is often 
thought to be a father of ethical naturalism. Could it be that Hume was 
objecting to his own enterprise? In fact, Hume’s “objection” is limited to 
one paragraph in his Treatise of Human Nature:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with  .  .  .  the author proceeds 
for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, 
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or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d 
to ﬁ nd, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is and is not, I meet 
with no proposition that is not connected with ought or ought not  .  .  .  [A]s this 
ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or afﬁ rmation, ‘tis necessary that 
shou’d be observ’d and explain’d  .  .  .  how this new relation can be a deduction from 
others, which are entirely different from it. (1739/1978, p. 469)
Hume is making a rather simple point here: one cannot draw normative 
conclusions from non-normative premises alone. But Hume found the 
slide from statements of mere fact to statements of value to be character-
istic of “vulgar systems of morality.” For him, morality was inexplicable 
without mentioning moral sentiments or passions.26
Let us return, then, to the objection in its current form—namely, that 
nothing normative follows from any of the empirical information we 
might gather from the natural, social, and human sciences. Perhaps the 
fear is that if the background theory is scientiﬁ c, this makes ethics a 
science, or that if the background theory is a science, we can suddenly 
violate the laws of logic and derive “oughts” from “is’s.” However, no one 
has suggested these things! No important moral philosopher, naturalist or 
non-naturalist, has ever thought that merely gathering together all rele-
vant descriptive truths would yield a full normative ethical theory. Morals 
are radically underdetermined by the merely descriptive, but so too, of 
course, are science and normative epistemology. All three are domains 
of inquiry where ampliative generalizations and underdetermined norms 
abound.
The smart naturalist makes no claims to establish demonstratively moral 
norms. Instead, he or she points to certain practices, values, virtues, and 
principles as reasonable based on inductive and abductive reasoning (more 
on this below). Indeed, anyone who thinks that Hume thought that the 
fallacy of claiming to move demonstratively from is’s to oughts revealed 
that normative ethics was a nonstarter hasn’t read Hume. After the famous 
passages in the Treatise about is-ought, Hume proceeds for several hundred 
pages to do normative moral philosophy. He simply never claims to dem-
onstrate anything. Why should he? Demonstration, Aristotle taught us long 
ago, is for the mathematical sciences, not for ethics.
Moore’s Fallacy
Regarding the challenges to naturalism based on open question arguments, 
the ethical naturalist has all the resources to effectively meet the chal-
lenges. Ethics naturalized need not be reductive, so there is no need to 
Naturalizing Ethics    15
deﬁ ne “the good” in some unitary way such that one can ask the allegedly 
devastating question: “But is that which is said to be ‘good,’ good?”
Indeed, the force of open question arguments ﬁ zzled with discoveries 
about failures of synonymy across the board—with discoveries about the 
lack of reductive deﬁ nitions for most interesting terms. Suppose “good” is 
taken to be a term and we think, as Moore does, that it should have a 
deﬁ nition. If Moore thinks (as it seems he does) that a deﬁ nition ought to 
supply necessary and sufﬁ cient conditions of application, then he is correct 
that if such a deﬁ nition were available then it would not be “open” to 
“questioning.” However, except for some technical terms (e.g., “even 
numbers” or “odd numbers”) and certain scientiﬁ c terms, most others do 
not have necessary and sufﬁ cient conditions of application. What we call 
“dictionary deﬁ nitions” are a mix of current usage patterns and functional 
characterizations. This makes sense, given that most terms in natural lan-
guage have some sort of prototype/exemplar/stereotype structure.27 It is 
not surprising that G. E. Moore couldn’t ﬁ nd a deﬁ nition of “good.” Failure 
to ﬁ nd a deﬁ nition of “good” would no more prove that it names a non-
natural property than the same failure to ﬁ nd deﬁ nitions for “fuzzy” or 
“chair” would prove that fuzziness is a non-natural property or that chairs 
are non-natural objects.
Moreover, “good” is not a singular term in our language, including the 
moral sense of “good.” Instead, it is a theoretical term in the following 
sense: we call different things morally good for different reasons. Moral 
virtues, for example, are morally good for reasons r1, r2  .  .  .  rn, and so on. 
It takes a complex moral conception to help ﬁ x the multiple meanings of 
“morally good.” This might be tantamount to saying that “morally good” 
names a heterogeneous set.
Relativism and Nihilism
This leads to some ﬁ nal alleged obstacles to naturalism—namely, that it 
typically leads to relativism, that it is deﬂ ationary and/or morally naive, 
or that it makes normativity a matter of power: either the power of 
benign but less than enlightened socialization forces or the power of those 
in charge of the normative order (possibly fascists, Nazis, or moral 
dunces).
How does naturalistic ethics avoid extreme relativism, or—even worse—
nihilism? The answer is simple: the ends of creatures constrain what is good 
for them. The relativist is attuned to relations that matter, to relations that 
have relevance to the matter at hand. Not all kinds of food, clothing, and 
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shelter suit us animals, us members of the species Homo sapiens. Nor do all 
interpersonal and intrapersonal practices suit us. Thus, there are substan-
tial constraints on what might count as an adequate morality stemming 
from intrapersonal and interpersonal factors.28 We are social animals with 
certain innate capacities and interests. Although the kinds of play, work, 
recreation, knowledge, communication, and friendship we seek have much 
to do with local socialization, the general fact that we like to play, work, 
recreate, know, communicate, and befriend seems to be part, as we say, of 
human nature.
The distinctively normative component of naturalistic ethics should 
explain why some norms (including norms governing choosing norms), 
values, and virtues are good or better than others. One common rationale 
for favoring a norm or set of norms is that it is suited to modify, suppress, 
transform, or amplify some characteristic or capacity belonging to our 
nature—either our animal nature or our nature as socially situated beings. 
Consider some of the core moral beliefs likely to be found across various 
cultures, beliefs concerning the permissibility of killing, rights to property 
and resources, and the need for norms of reciprocity. These beliefs might 
vary from culture to culture, but they all serve to regulate and promote 
human social life. Even prior to the powerful (natural) effects of culture, 
we prefer different things when it comes to shelter, play, communica-
tion, and friendship than beavers, otters, dolphins, birds, orangutans, 
and bonobos. Morality cannot seek to instantiate behavior that no 
human beings have a propensity to seek. This much constrains extreme 
relativism.
This seems to reduce morality to a system of hypothetical imperatives that 
hinge on our wanting to secure certain aims: “If you want to secure social 
cooperation, then you ought to __.” It is true that naturalists cannot allow 
for categorical imperatives if they are conceived as independent of human 
interests and values, or categorical imperatives that are binding to all 
rational beings, wherever they may be. Yet while the aims of naturalistic 
ethics are internal to the motivational systems of the species Homo sapiens, 
they are external to any particular individual member of that species.29 This 
follows from the view that there are a limited number of goods that human 
beings seek given their nature and potentialities, and these goods (or aims) 
limit what can be placed as antecedents to the hypothetical conditionals. 
In referring to these facts in moral discourse one is not simply pointing to 
preexisting propensities in any given individual but is rather referring to 
basic and fundamental reasons stemming from human nature that might 
help shape and channel the particular propensities of any given individual. 
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In this sense, they do have some “categorical” force.30 Pluralistic relativism 
articulates and advances a theory about the constraints on “morally ade-
quate” plural ways of life that aim at the set (or some subset) of the goods 
that constitute morality, broadly construed.
Nihilism is also not a problem. Humans seek value; we aspire to goods, 
to things that matter and interest us. Now, nihilism can be a problem for 
individuals when their “motivating” reasons (discussed above) are exposed 
as not good “grounding” or “justifying” reasons. (The loss of faith in 
parental wisdom and authority during adolescence is such an example.) 
Nihilism is also a familiar problem for theists who lose their faith, and for 
very depressed humans for whom things have stopped mattering. However, 
nihilism is not a special problem for naturalists. Animals like surviving; 
reﬂ ective animals like living well. Over world-historical time, reﬂ ective 
animals develop goals for living—welfare, happiness, love, friendship, 
respect, personal and interpersonal ﬂ ourishing. These are not an altogether 
happy and consistent family of values. Still, even if there are incompati-
bilities involved among the ends we as animals, socialized animals, seek, 
the fact remains that there are ends we seek, and nihilism is not normally 
an issue—it is not usually a “live option.” Nihilism is the view that nothing 
matters. Things do matter for us—certain things matter because of our 
membership in a certain biological species, and certain things in virtue 
of how we have evolved as social beings with a history. That is the way 
it is.
Ethics Naturalized: Pluralism and Human Ecology
We close with Dewey’s insight that “Moral science is not something with 
a separate province. It is physical, biological, and historic knowledge placed 
in a humane context where it will illuminate and guide the activities of 
men” (1922, pp. 204–205). What is relevant to ethical reﬂ ection is every-
thing we know, everything we can bring to ethical conversation that merits 
attention. To put a pragmatist spin on the point, we can say that moral 
knowledge obeys the canons of inductive and deductive logic, statistics, 
and probability theory in producing warranted beliefs about which traits 
are virtues, which are vices, and about what values, actions, norms, and 
principles reliably produce social coordination and human ﬂ ourishing. The 
normative component involves the imaginative deployment of informa-
tion from any source useful to self/social examination, forming new or 
improved norms and values, improving moral educational practices, train-
ing moral sensibilities, and so on. These sources include psychology, 
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cognitive science, and all the human sciences (especially history and 
anthropology), as well as literature, the arts (for the arts are ways of 
knowing and ways of expressing insights about our nature and about 
matters of value and worth),31 and ordinary conversation based on ordi-
nary everyday observations about how individuals, groups, communities, 
nation states, the community of persons or sentient beings are faring. The 
aims relevant to this sort of pragmatic evaluation are various and capable 
of speciﬁ cation on various levels. First-order, second-order, third-order, 
and possibly higher-order level evaluation of norms are things natural 
human minds can do (or are capacities that can be developed in certain 
cultures). We can tinker with these aims, systematizing them where this 
proves useful, minding severe conﬂ icts (e.g., between universal and par-
ticular duties), and thinking of possible ways of addressing them (e.g., 
through revising our norms). The pragmatist is committed to the require-
ment that normative judgments get ﬁ lled out in conversation and debate, 
that his or her background criteria are open to criticism and reformulation, 
and that terms like “what works” and “what conduces to ﬂ ourishing” are 
superordinate terms. Speciﬁ city is gained in more ﬁ ne-grained discussion 
of particular issues. Even if there is no such thing as “transcendent ration-
ality,” no ultimate or non-question-begging way of establishing one’s 
viewpoint over another, there are perfectly reasonable ways of analyzing 
problems and proposing solutions.
If ethics is like any science or is part of any science, it is part of human 
ecology, concerned with saying what contributes to the well-being of 
humans, human groups, and human individuals in particular natural and 
social environments. What is good depends a great deal on what is good 
for a particular community, but when that community interacts with other 
communities, then these get a say. Furthermore, what might seem like a 
good practice or ideal can, when all the information from history, anthro-
pology, psychology, philosophy, and literature is brought in, turn out not 
to have been such a good idea after all. If ethics is part human ecology, 
the norms governing the evaluation of practices and ideals will have to be 
as broad as possible. To judge ideals, it will not do simply to look and see 
whether healthy persons and healthy communities are subserved by them 
in the here and now; it must also be the case that this “health” is bought 
without incorporating practices—slavery, racism, sexism, and the like—
which we know can go unnoticed for some time but that can keep persons 
from ﬂ ourishing and eventually poison human relations, if not in the 
present, at least in nearby generations.
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The aims of morality are heterogeneous, not always individually or col-
lectively or at all times optimiﬁ cally satisﬁ able. One aim of ethics is to try 
to make the best of this fact in particular ecological niches, particular 
historical communities with their own sets of aims, practices, and so forth. 
Thinking of normative ethical knowledge as something to be gleaned from 
thinking about human good relative to particular ecological niches will 
make it easier for us to see that there are forces of many kinds, operating 
at many levels, as humans seek their good; that individual human good 
can compete with the good of human groups and of nonhuman systems; 
and ﬁ nally, that only some ethical knowledge is global—most is local, and 
appropriately so. It might also make it seem less compelling to ﬁ nd ethical 
agreement where none is needed.
The localized and contingent nature of many of the values we hold dear 
is no reason for not cherishing them, no reason to deny them a constitu-
tive role in providing meaning. There are some things to be said for con-
tingency (besides the fact that consciousness of it can possibly undermine 
conﬁ dence, self-respect, and their suite). Recognition of contingency has 
the advantage of being historically, sociologically, anthropologically, and 
psychologically realistic. Realism is a form of authenticity, and authentic-
ity has much to be said in its favor. Furthermore, recognition of contin-
gency can engender respect for human diversity, which engenders tolerant 
attitudes. This has generally positive moral and political consequences. 
And this is all consistent with deploying our critical capacities in judging 
the quality and worth of alternative ways of being. Attunement to contin-
gency, plural values, and the vast array of possible human lives and per-
sonalities opens the way for use of important and underutilized human 
capacities: capacities for critical reﬂ ection, for seeking deep understanding 
of alternative ways of being and living, and for deploying our agentic 
capacities to modify ourselves by engaging in identity experimentation 
and meaning location within the vast space of possibilities that have been 
and are being tried by our fellows. There are many things to be said in 
favor of emphasizing “consciousness of contingency.”
The pluralistic relativist, the pragmatic human ecologist, has the right 
attitude—right for a world in which proﬁ table communication and politics 
demand respect and tolerance, but in which no one expects a respectful, 
tolerant person or polity to lose the capacity to identify and resist evil 
where it exists, and right in terms of the development of our capacities of 
sympathetic understanding, acuity in judgment, and self-modiﬁ cation—
and, on occasion, radical transformation.32
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Notes
1. McDowell coined the term “bald naturalism” (McDowell, 1996) and sometimes 
characterizes it in a way that engenders or is akin to moral skepticism. In principle, 
a naturalist might be a moral skeptic, believing that there are no moral properties 
as ordinarily conceived and thus that moral propositions are literally false (or mean-
ingless). There is nothing ethics is about, and so forth. See J. L. Mackie (1977). 
For a more recent treatment, see Joyce (2001). Duke naturalism is also superior to 
Rutgers naturalism, but showing this will await a subsequent paper. It is possible that 
Duke naturalism and Michigan naturalism can be coalesced into Duke-Michigan 
naturalism.
2. For other discussions of naturalism in philosophy, see Bouwsma (1948), Kitcher 
(1992), and Rosenberg (1996), as well as entries on “Naturalism” in Honderich 
(1995) and Audi (1999).
3. Not all scientiﬁ c naturalists are ethical naturalists, but it would be a rare bird who 
was an ethical naturalist but not also a scientiﬁ c naturalist. Typically a view that 
incorporates these two kinds of naturalism is epistemically imperialistic as far as this 
world goes.
4. There is precedent for this sort of view. The French deists thought it acceptable 
to posit God as creator so long as one accepted that once God got the cosmic ball 
rolling he removed himself from worldly affairs. This move entails that inside “the 
familiar natural world” all explanation and justiﬁ cation can be done without appeal 
to God’s incorporeal nature, miracles, nonphysical forces, and so on. A deist, then, 
looks prima facie to be a type of naturalist who is not an atheist. Newton believed 
in God, and although he was not particularly attracted to deism, he proceeded to 
do physics in a fully naturalistic manner. And Darwin did biology in a fully natu-
ralistic way both before and after he lost his faith in God because of the problem 
of evil—spurred by the death of a beloved child.
5. Kitcher (1992) and Stroud (1996) claim that naturalism is pretty much the only 
game in town. This claim has credibility to the degree that they intend some version 
of the idea that for the purposes of doing ontology (or for naturalized epistemology 
or ethics) divine agency does not need to be introduced to play an explanatory role. 
Stroud, for example, thinks that Plantinga is a naturalist when it comes to descrip-
tive epistemology, but not when it comes to normative epistemology. However, 
there are other major contemporary philosophers whose views should also give him 
pause, such as W. P. Alston, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Charles Taylor. MacIntyre 
(1988, 1991) holds a two-level view; like Aquinas, he thinks that there are natural 
and supernatural justiﬁ cations of norms. The natural justiﬁ cations are satisfactory 
but the divine ones are “more” ultimate. Taylor (1989) expresses the idea that 
perhaps God can play a role in the justiﬁ cation of our ethical norms.
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6. Ontological naturalism is the view that what there is, and all there is, is natural. 
Everything that exists/has existed, happens/will ever happen, is a natural phenom-
enon, process, or event. Every property, event, process, and thing, if it genuinely 
exists/is happening, did exist/happen, or will exist/happen, is natural. This is the 
right deﬁ nition, but it is not especially helpful until we specify what it means to be 
“natural.” This is surprisingly hard. Imagine a world governed by Newtonian physics 
and Darwin’s theory, supplemented by whatever chemistry and molecular biology 
(etc.) go neatly with them. In this world “natural” would mean something like this: 
what there is and all there is, is whatever Newtonian physics and the principles of 
Darwinian biology say there is or can be. Furthermore, all the events in this world 
are explained, or explainable, by the causal laws of (or extendable from) these two 
theories (plus chemistry, etc.). This much would give us the familiar picture of the 
natural as comprised of law-governed material, and it would provide us with a 
story of why the physical universe contains what it does and behaves as it does, as 
well as how life came to be, evolved, and so on. The trouble is that contemporary 
physics is wilder and woolier than Newton’s physics. There is quantum indetermi-
nacy. There are particles or strings that are the same size in relation to a single 
proton as a single proton is in relation to known universe. There are (if string 
theory is true) at least ten spatial dimensions as well as one for time. Gravity is weak 
because gravitons escape from our universe into other ones through wormholes in 
space.
The story that our universe originated in a Big Bang thirteen or fourteen billion 
years ago was always somewhat mysterious. How did the singularity that banged 
get there? Some will say that there was “no there” then. Well, there was no “then” 
either because space and time as we know them only came into being when the 
“thing that wasn’t quite there then” banged. Many sensible people have found this 
explanation less than satisfying. As we’ve said, more than 90% of Americans believe 
that a supernatural force, indeed a personal God, created the universe. If scientists 
can get away with postulating that the singularity that was not really “there then” 
led to there being “hereness,” “thereness,” “nowness,” “thenness,” and so on, many 
theists feel licensed to posit their own kind of mystery. See Craig and Sinnott-
Armstrong (2004).
Contemporary physics now seriously toys with explaining away the mystery of 
the Big Bang in this way: our universe, which appears to be four dimensional (three 
space, one time), isn’t. The thing that appears that way is really eleven dimensional, 
and it was formed—guess when?—thirteen or fourteen billion years ago when a 
preexisting universe wormed its way into empty space in our vicinity. How did that 
sneaky universe get going? Same way. It’s universes all the way back, down, and so 
on. See, for example, Greene (2000).
7. The epistemological humility called for is not so humble that it tolerates agnos-
ticism. The agnostic plays a familiar game, thinking it makes epistemic sense to stop 
with three possibilities: theism, agnosticism, and atheism. But the quietist thinks 
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the agnostic has been tricked into playing a fool’s game. There is no reason to play 
the game or address the questions that force the familiar three choices. Just say “no” 
to talking about the supernatural and only then, apparently, will you see that 
nothing epistemically respectable can be said on such matters.
8. See also Putnam (2004).
9. Indeed, Pigden (1991) suggests that the belief in the nonexistence of such irreduc-
ible sui generis moral properties or facts is what unites the category of naturalists. 
Most naturalists maintain that if ethics provides a respectable kind of wisdom, then 
moral properties, values, virtues, norms, oughts, and so on must be analyzed in ways 
that do not involve ontologically queer properties, forces, or commitments. The 
kind of naturalism defended here is quietistic with regard to the existence of super-
natural forces or entities. This is also true of natural moral properties. We imply no 
position on the question of whether there really are, or are not, moral properties in 
the universe in the sense debated by moral realists, anti-realists, and quasi-realists. 
The important thing is that moral claims can be rationally supported, not that all 
the constituents of such claims refer (or fail to refer) to “real” things. Furthermore, 
in both the realism/antirealism cases and the cognitivist/noncognitivist case, differ-
ent answers might be given at the descriptive and normative levels. Mackie (1977) 
is an example of a philosopher who thought that ordinary people were committed 
to a form of realism about values but were wrong. In spite of this, Mackie saw no 
problem with advocating utilitarianism as the best moral theory, and in that sense 
was a cognitivist—a cognitivist antirealist, as it were.
10. Kant (1964).
11. Thanks (or no thanks) to Kant, the dominant conception of the intellectual 
division of labor makes a sharp distinction between moral philosophy and moral 
psychology. Moral philosophy is in the business of saying what ought to be, what 
is really right and wrong, good and evil, what the proper moral principles and rules 
are, what counts as genuine moral motivation, and what types of persons count as 
genuinely good. Most importantly, the job of moral philosophy is to provide 
philosophical justiﬁ cation for its “shoulds” and “oughts,” for its principles and 
its rules.
12. Despite his commitment to the project of the enlightenment, Kant in fact 
believed in God—namely, the God of pietistic Lutheranism. And he believed that 
God was, in fact, the ultimate source of morality. Kant saw that disagreement about 
theological details could be circumvented so long as God had given us a faculty of 
pure practical reason in which and through which all conscientious persons could 
discover the right moral principle.
13. Kant’s insights are not justiﬁ ed (if they are justiﬁ ed) by the full story of the 
genesis of these insights. The point, instead, is that Kant was (1) standing at a certain 
place in the articulation and development of certain norms in Europe, (2) was heir 
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to a set of critical norms for thinking about norms, and (3) deployed these norms 
of rationality and criticism when evaluating the practices and opinions revealed in 
history and when imaginatively extrapolating from history. His situation and his 
smarts enabled him to express some of the deepest moral insight ever expressed. 
However, although Kant was very smart, he lacked insight when it came to telling 
us what it was that he was consulting in displaying his deep moral insights. Hume 
was doing roughly the same thing, though he understood somewhat what he was 
doing when he engaged in espousing certain norms. Surely no one thinks that 
Hume’s arguments against religious institutions and religious belief were based on 
anything like simple description of the practices of most people. He believed that 
religious belief and practices led, more often than not, to cruelty and intolerance. 
Given the fact that, in addition, such beliefs and practices are based on claims that 
humans lack the cognitive equipment to make with warrant, we have a two pronged 
argument for the adjustment of ordinary epistemic and ethical norms. For more on 
Kant and naturalistic ethics, see Greene in volume 3 of this collection.
14. Motivational grounds to one side, there is always the interesting question of 
whether, even if we judge the reasons motivating some norm(s) unwarranted, we 
judge the norm(s) themselves unwarranted. There is no strict implication. One is 
inclined to say that even if you behave well only because you believe “Santa Claus 
thoughts,” you should still behave well even though there is no Santa Claus—albeit 
for non-Santa-Clausy reasons. On the other hand, it just may be the case that, across 
multifarious social contexts, things like “Santa Claus thoughts” motivate as well—if 
not better—than “Mom and Dad disapprove of __” thoughts. If this is so, we need 
an explanation of how beliefs in certain kinds of nonexistent objects can motivate 
and motivate powerfully. False beliefs that produce goods are an interesting 
phenomenon, but they create no special problem for the naturalist.
15. Chisholm might, however, say that the self depends on and is often affected by 
the body, and so is part of the natural world in this limited sense.
16. See, for example, Wegner (2002).
17. See Flanagan (2002).
18. An exception is what Dan Dennett (1984) calls “pockets of local fatalism.”
19. It is worth marking the fact that when Darwin speaks of “deep religious feelings” 
being involved in the development of conscience, he points to an anthropological 
commonplace that we will try to explain. The naturalist may need to accept that 
humans have dispositions that easily yield religious beliefs and feelings and that 
these are widely utilized to produce moral motivation. This, of course, is different 
from saying such beliefs are warranted or true.
20. Quine does have an answer to the worry that his program eliminates the norma-
tive. Judge its adequacy for yourself: “A word now about the status, for me, of 
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epistemic values. Naturalization of epistemology does not jettison the normative 
and settle for the indiscriminate description of ongoing procedures. For me norma-
tive epistemology is a branch of engineering. It is the technology of truth-seeking, 
or, in a more cautiously epistemological term, prediction. Like any technology, it 
makes free use of whatever scientiﬁ c ﬁ ndings may suit its purpose. It draws upon 
mathematics in computing standard deviation and probable error and in scouting 
the gambler’s fallacy. It draws upon experimental psychology in exposing perceptual 
illusions, and upon cognitive psychology in scouting wishful thinking. It draws 
upon neurology and physics, in a general way, in discounting testimony from occult 
or parapsychological sources. There is no question here of ultimate value, as in 
morals; it is a matter of efﬁ cacy for an ulterior end, truth or prediction. The norma-
tive here, as elsewhere in engineering, becomes descriptive when the terminal 
parameter is expressed. We could say the same of morality if we could view it as 
aimed at reward in heaven” (Quine, 1986, pp. 664–665).
21. Alvin Goldman (1986, 1992) has produced arguably the best work in naturalized 
epistemology. Goldman never tries to derive normative conclusions from descriptive 
premises. Furthermore, he continually emphasizes the historical and social dimen-
sions of epistemology in a way that Quine perhaps has not. See also Kornblith 
(1994).
22. In epistemology, pragmatic evaluation is done relative to our cognitive aims. 
These, to be sure, are themselves norms and, as such, are subject to the same sort 
of requests for rationales and warrant as all other norms.
23. If, to take one example, connectionism’s right, then this must have implications 
for the nature of successful inquiry, and in particular what constitutes successful 
reasoning.
24. Although our approach is different from McDowell’s, we don’t think we can be 
charged with bald naturalism. Actually, it’s unclear who he would think is an actual 
bald naturalist in ethics—unless he is thinking of John Mackie, possibly A. J. Ayer, 
and perhaps some evolutionary psychologists. We’d be interested in hearing him 
name names.
25. The descriptive-genealogical component will itself be normative in one sense: it 
will involve descriptions of human actions (etc.) and thus trafﬁ c in intentional 
description. However, it will not be normatively ethical.
26. See Sutherland and Hughes (2000).
27. See Casebeer (2003b) for a similar argument against Moore. Prinz (2002) has an 
edifying discussion of concepts and their prototype-like structure.
28. A more detailed account can be found in David Wong’s (2006b) Natural 
Moralities.
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29. For more on this view, see Wong (2006a, 2006b).
30. For another take on the problems of categoricity and nihilism from a natural-
istic perspective, see Railton (1986). Railton believes moral imperatives apply even 
to those who have no reason to follow them, because rationality is not a precondi-
tion of moral obligation. This represents one way of introducing categoricity 
that is different from our own approach. Railton uses a similar tactic to evade 
nihilism.
31. Richard Rorty (1991) convincingly suggests that the formulation of general moral 
principles has proven less useful to the development of liberal institutions than has 
the gradual expansion of the imagination, for example through the writings of indi-
viduals such as Friedrich Engels, Harriet Taylor and J. S. Mill, Harriet Beecher Stowe, 
Bronislaw Malinowski, Martin Luther King, Jr., Alexis de Tocqueville, and Catherine 
MacKinnon.
32. Our thanks to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong for many helpful comments on drafts 
of this chapter.
